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Decades back, a most prominent justice philosopher, John Rawls, put forth
ac l e a rd e ﬁnition of fairness in problems of social choice. Decision theory, which
studies individual, and not social, choice has provided axiomatizations of de-
cision rules in many settings, most prominently in settings where individuals
face uncertainty (and not just risk). It turns out that there exists an analytical
connection between these two branches of thought. This note exploits the afore-
mentioned connection, by reading the social choice problem in terms of decision
theory and (partially) exploiting the existing axiomatization. The purpose of
the note is to obtain new and interesting questions more than it is to answer
them, so it concludes by proposing a research problem.
Suppose that there is a society C
Example 1: Think of a coalition of countries considering a joint militar
operation.
Example 2: Or, think of the board of directors of a ﬁrm.
Suppose that there is a ﬁnite set X 6= ∅ of social outcomes.
The members of the society derive utility from the outcome, measured by a
function u : X −→ R
Example 1 continued: Assume that the stakes of the military operation
are the same for all of its members.
Example 2 continued: Or, assume that all the members of the board
represent an identical proportion of shares.
The members of the society face two types of uncertainty: objective (roulette)
and subjective (horserace). This is: let SX be the set of all probability distrib-
utions on X and let Σ 6= ∅ be a set of states of the world; a choice is a mapping
f : Σ −→ SX; this means that, for a given state of the world σ, what the society
chooses is a distribution f (σ) over X.
Example 1 continued: Diﬀerent values of x will represent diﬀerent payoﬀs
of the military operation (a constant return minus a random cost of securing that
1return) and the randomness will be given by the weather the military operation
faces.
Example 2 continued: Or, diﬀerent values of x will represent diﬀerent
proﬁts by the ﬁrm, and the randomness will be given by objective industry con-
ditions.
The society, however, is unable to exactly ﬁx the distribution of outcomes,
because it cannot control the state σ.
Example 1 continued: A choice by the coalition can be a particular mil-
itary strategy, that prescribes what operation will be performed at each state of
the world, and the state of the world is given by the degree of resistence the op-
eration encounters. Alternatively, the choice of the coalition may be to appoint
a particular General to command the operation, with uncertainty regarding the
person’s skill, and states represent all combinations of diﬀerent levels of skill of
potential candidates.
Example 2 continued: Or, the choice may be a particular marketing strat-
egy prescribing the actions to be taken at each state of the world, the latter rep-
resenting diﬀerent policies that an authority may undertake. Alternatively, the
board may hire a given CEO, with uncertainty regarding the person’s skill, and
states represent all combinations of diﬀerent levels of skill of potential candi-
dates.
Let F be the space of choices.
Assume that the members of the society diﬀer in terms of their subjec-
tive probabilities (i.e. probabilities over states of the world) and identify the
members with their beliefs: C ⊆ SΣ,w h e r eSΣ is the set of all probability
distributions on Σ.
Suppose that the society designs a mechanism that allows it to choose: it
adopts a choice correspondenme M : P (F)\∅ ⇒ F, such that
(∀F ⊆ F,F 6= ∅):M (F) 6= ∅ and M (F) ⊆ F
Mechanism M is fair (Rawlsian) if















The problem posited so far is a social choice problem, and the concept of
fair mechanism is borrowed from distributional philosophy. It just so happens,
however, that the problem is mathematically equivalent to an individual choice
problem in which the person faces risk (roulette: the distribution f) and Knight-
ian uncertainty (horserace: she does not know for sure the distribution f and
2is instead endowed with a set C ⊆ SΣ of prior beliefs), which aﬀects her nega-
tively. Hence, it is immediate that one can exploit any axiomatization oﬀered
by the solution to the individual choice problem to reinterpret the meaning of
the concept of fairness!
If a society is fair, then its social preferences can be represented by a binary
relation on F (formally a subset of F×F) constituting a complete preorder (in
the sense that given any pair of possible choices, it is able to determine that one
of them is at least as good as the other, and this binary relation is transitive).
This is obvious. What is less obvious is that such relation must also satisfy some
other properties.
Let º represent the social binary relation, and denote by Â its.asymetric
part. It follows from Gilboa and Schmeidler’s axiomatization of a maxmin ex-
pected utility decision maker (Maxmin expected utility with non-unique priors,
Journal of Mathematical Economics, 18, 1989, 141-153) that º satisﬁes:.
1. State independent choices do not change the ranking of state dependent
choices: mixing ranked choices with strategies that do not depend on the
state of the world does not change the original ranking. Formally, let
f ∈ F be such that ∀σ,σ0 ∈ Σ, f (σ)=f (σ0). Then, º satisﬁes that
(f Â f0 and α ∈ (0,1)) =⇒ αf +( 1− α)f Â αf0 +( 1− α)f
2. Small enough perturbations of choices do not change rankings: suppose
that three choices are strictly ranked; a mixture of the best choice with
the worst choice that gives a high enough weight to the best choice will
still be better than the intermediate choice, and if it gives a high enough
weight to the worst choice it will still be worse than the intermediate
choice. Formally, ∀f,f0,f00 ∈ F,
f Â f0 Â f00 =⇒ (∃α,α0 ∈ (0,1)) : αf+(1 − α)f00 Â f0 and f Â α0f0+(1 − α0)f00
3. It is monotonous: suppose that a choice is such that each of its state
contingent prescriptions is considered at least as good as the corresponding
prescription of another choice (as if there were no state uncertainty), then
the ﬁrst choice is considered at least as good as the second one. Suppose









then f º f0.
4. It is averse to dissent: if two choices are considered to be just as desirable
for the society, then any mixture of them will be at least as good.
(f º f0 and f0 º f)= ⇒ (∀α ∈ [0,1]) : αf +( 1− α)f0 º f
3Although these properties may not have been immediate from the statement
of the problem, they come for free by analogy to the maxmin expected utility
decision maker. Since they are necessary conditions, they may be used to assess
how convincing, or convenient, the Rawlsian notion of fairness is, which may
add new elements to the discussion in distributional philosophy. If they turn out
to be convincing, it is interesting to know whether they are also suﬃcient (this
does not follow immediately from the suﬃciency part of Gilboa and Schmeidler,
because their set C is constructed and here it is given). An obvious question is
whether the analogy can be pushed further or if it has implications in the other
direction.
Moreover, notice that our analysis implicitly assumes that the beliefs of all
t h em e m b e r so ft h es o c i e t ya r ec o m m o nk n o w l e d g e( i nt h ef o r m a ls e n s eo ft h e
concept: known, known to be known, known to be known to be known and
so on). Although this issue would not arise in individual decision theory, it
w o u l db em o r er e a l i s t i ct oa s s u m et h a tt h e s eb e l i e f sa r ep r i v a t ei n f o r m a t i o n
and must somehow be revealed (or elicited) before the mechanism is applied,
and individuals may act strategically when doing so. Adding yet another edge
to the problem (implementation theory) an interesting question is: Is the fair
mechanism incentive compatible?
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